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Considero en este estudio las proposiciones ‘qua’, en que un sujeto
posee un atributo en un determinado respecto.  Luego de indicar por qué
estos enunciados tienen importancia central en teoría científica y filosófica,
ofrezco un modelo formal general para ellos.  Resumo los análisis de las
proposiciones ‘qua’ dados en la tradición aristotélica de la  reduplicación.
Muestro cómo derivar estos tipos aristotélicos a partir del modelo más
general.
Abstract
I consider here ‘qua’ propositions, statements that a subject has an
attribute in a certain respect. After indicating why these statements have
central importance in philosophical and scientific theory,  I offer a general
formal model for them.  I summarize logical analyses of qua propositions
given in the Aristotelian tradition of reduplication.  I show how to derive
these Aristotelian types from the more general model.
Reality has a hierarchical structure… with each level indepen-
dent, to some degree, of the levels above and below, ‘At each stage,
entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations are necessary, re-
quiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the
previous one.’1
Perhaps I should explain why a theory of qua objects, of qua-
lification, has importance in advance. In ordinary discourse, people
often qualify what they say by appealing to one respect or another of
what is being said. Philosophers too seek to qualify their statements,
for the sake of greater precision of theory, or for the sake of avoiding
the ignominious elenchus, or for the sake of pretentiousness or...
1 John Horgan, The Undiscovered Mind (New York, 1999), p. 250, quoting
Philip Anderson, ‘‘More is Different’’, Science, 1972.
6Indeed some whole metaphysical systems seem to have been built on
qua-lification talk: Father Parmenides, one hopes; certainly the
Carvaka and the Nyaya and certain Buddhists; perhaps Spinoza
with his modes and Hegel with his moments, not to mention Aristotle
in his attempt to avoid Eleatic refutations. So it is not surprising that
philosophers have given logical analyses of the structure of state-
ments containing qualifications.
For example, an atom on an adjacent lower level is composed of
protons, electrons and neutrons. These, being quantum particles, do
not exist continuously (and perhaps may themselves be sequences of
independently occurring quantum phases). These subatomic particles
obey statistical laws having quantum uncertainty. An atom composed
of these particles may be taken to exist continuously and to obey laws
that are at any rate often stated as if there is no quantum uncertainty
etc. Now we, including physicists, talk about such an atom as if it is
a thing separate from the particles that compose it. Indeed, from the
perspective of those particles it is accidental where they are and
whether or not they constitute parts of that atom. Yet we still talk as
if electrons as well as atoms are real. We also assert that we would be
double-counting if we were to talk about the particles and the atom
existing as totally separate things—rather like Ryle’s example of
counting the football players and then counting the football team.
In my jargon, the atom is taken as an object composed of certain
aspects of the subatomic particles. Note that the atom itself has certain
aspects when it is taken as part of a molecule, which in turn has aspects
when it is taken as part of an amino acid… of a cell… of an apple…
Again, all this is but one dimension of aspect and object. We can
also, qua sociologists, consider electrons as a cultural construct as
given in a theory, itself done by human beings in the role of physi-
cist etc. Here we have EXFOLIATION, the proliferation of aspects, in
another type of discourse, another dimension. We can also consider
an electron to be an inspiration for a painting or a comic book.
So I want a logic that handles how we –here the human and not
the ideally rational or the philosophers’ ‘‘we’’– talk truly about the
world. Such a theory of things and respects provides a logical model
for this ontology. It also gives a general analysis of the language of
respects, when we say that things have different respects, or speak
of something in respect of this or in respect of that.
Here I 1) present the results of my earlier study of Aristotelian
theories of qua propositions, also known as ‘‘reduplicative proposi-
tions’’ 2) give a general, formal model for qua propositions, and 3)
7show how the types of qua propositions appearing in Aristotle’s texts
and distinguished in the Aristotelian tradition fall under that model.
Qua Propositions
The basic structure of a qualified simple assertion is that of a
simpler predication with an additional qualification. Let me now
generalize and talk of ‘qua propositions’. A qua proposition is a
simple(r) proposition with a qualifying phrase with a connective like
‘qua’, ‘in respect of’, ‘in virtue of the fact that’ and its complement.
‘Qua’ is the general connective of which ‘qua’ is one instance. The
general form is: ‘S qua M is P’.2 In many sentences, the ‘S’ term sig-
nifies the thing; the ‘M’ term the ‘‘respect’’ [not strictly speaking; see
below].
The Aristotelian tradition has marked off two main logical types
of qua propositions, of form ‘S is P qua M’. In the (strictly) redupli-
cative type, the respect introduced by the M term has a predicative
relation to the original subject and predicate, and sets restrictions on
that predication. The original subject S is preserved along with ‘P’
continuing to be asserted of it. In the specificative type, the respect
introduced by the M term has another, ‘‘mereological’’ relation to the
original subject and predicate, and changes the original predication,
so as not necessarily to be true of the original subject, at least for
many types of parts, but rather of its ‘‘part’’.
A central criterion for a qua proposition being reduplicative is
the validity of the secundum quid ad simpliciter inference:
S qua M is P; therefore, S is P.
Moreover, since S is being asserted to be P in the respect that it is M,
it is being asserted that S is M. Because the respect of M, a feature
of M, is a certain complex of properties of S, the reason why S is P is
that S has those properties, it is being asserted [in most cases: per-
haps not for qua this M] that M is P. So the general, default form
[Reduplicative] Every S qua M is P iff Every S is M, and every M is
P (or: to be an M is to be a P)
We can get at the syntax by giving truth conditions for redupli-
cative propositions. I list below the truth conditions that I have given
2 I use this form for the Aristotelian qua proposition as it has material presup-
positions. For the purely logical form I use ‘Φ qua Ψ is K’.
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that would be accepted in the Aristotelian tradition:
(i) Every S is P qua M (reduplicative) if and only if:
(x)((Sx ⊃ Mx) & (Mx ⊃ Px)) (12)3
The Aristotelian tradition had two main subtypes: one, which I
call the restrictive, used in scientific demonstration, where the rea-
son or cause for the predication, given by the M term, should be com-
mensurately universal with the predicate:
(ii) Every S is P qua M (restrictive reduplicative) if and only if:
(x)((Sx ⊃ Mx) & (Mx ≡ Px)) (20)
Another, which I call the abstractive, concerns the demarcation of the
sciences: physics studies substances qua moving; metaphysics stud-
ies beings qua being:
(iii) Every S is P qua M (abstractive reduplicative) if and only if:
(x)(Sx ⊃ (Mx & Px)) and ‘P’ is an M-type predicate (97)
Some examples:
Every isosceles triangle qua isosceles triangle has its interior
angles equal to 180°. [true reduplicatively and abstractively; false
restrictively]
Every isosceles triangle qua triangle has its interior angles equal
to 180°. [true restrictively; reduplicatively and abstractively]
The Great Pyramid qua geometrical is a triangular pyramid.
[true abstractively; false reduplicatively and restrictively]
Being qua mathematical is quantitative. [likewise]
The reduplicative qua phrase then explains why S is P. This expla-
nation can be given a weaker or a stronger causal sense.
With specificative propositions, the secundum quid ad simplic-
iter inference, ‘if S qua M is P, S is P’, does not follow. To use
Aristotle’s example, which became the standard one, if the Ethiopian
with respect to his teeth is white (the Ethiopian’s teeth are white),
it does not follow that the Ethiopian is white. Here ‘P’, what is predi-
cated of the original subject S need not be predicated of S in the re-
3 The numbers in parentheses are the numbers for these analyses in On Re-
duplication, Leiden, 1996.
9spect specified (M). That is, the predicates of that respect of S need
not be predicates of S. If we take the notion of part broadly, as is tra-
ditional though not too contemporary,4 we can think of the respect M
as being a part of S. Then the fallacy of composition and division can
apply here: what is true of the part need not be true of the whole, and
vice versa. So we can give the following analysis of an accidental qua
proposition:
[Specificative] Every S qua M is P iff S qua M is a part of S, and
everything that is S qua M is P [not that every M is P, but every
M of S is P, in a mereological sense of ‘of’].
This can be formalized, not too informatively as:
(iv) Every S is P qua M (specificative) if and only if:
(x) ((Mx & x εi S) ⊃ Px), where ‘x εi M’ indicates a part-whole
relation between x and M (46)
This Ethiopian (say, Haile) is white with respect to his teeth.
The Aristotelian tradition claims that all qua propositions that
are true reduplicatively are true specificatively on some part-whole
relation.
The semantics for reduplicative qua phrases presents no more
difficulty than what is needed for analyzing usual predicative sen-
tences, as the analyses given above suggest. The reduplicative qua
complexes formed may seem to have a reference different than the
original subject.
However specificative qua phrases immediately, by themselves,
change the reference of the original subject. This becomes controver-
sial only because some of the ‘‘parts’’ needed for the reference of spec-
ificative qua complexes are of types for which some do not want an
ontological commitment: such parts do not seem realistic. ‘Haile in
respect of his teeth’ might be acceptable; this just refers to his teeth,
traditionally called an integral part. Here that phrase might be nam-
ing something different from Haile, his teeth. But ‘Haile’ in respect
of being mentioned in this sentence’ seems a less robustly real part,
needing to distinction in reality. Yet right now I am considering a
logical formal model and so allow all sorts of parts.
4 Peter Simons, Parts, Oxford, 1987; J. T. J. Srzednick and V. F. Rickey, eds.,
Les´   niewski’s Systems: Ontology and Mereology, The Hague, 1984.
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A Formal Model of Thing and Respect
Starting with these analyses, we can construct a much more gen-
eral formal model of qua propositions than what the Aristotelian
tradition offers. Being able to do this does not ipso facto repudiate the
Aristotelian tradition, once we recognize what it is doing. For its situ-
ation here resembles the one with modal operators. Aristotle has a
conception of, say, necessity, that in modern terms concerns physi-
cal and not logical necessity. What he finds necessary concerns what
is necessary in this world, and not in any possible world.5 This is
clear from his general discussions of necessity as well as from his
examples of necessary propositions, like ‘it is necessary that a swan
is an animal’. In contrast, in modern modal logic, this statement
would not be considered necessary [unless we add on material mean-
ing postulates à la Carnap]. Rather, formal tautologies like ‘A ⊃ A’
are logically necessary.
As I am developing this model with an ontological eye to the gen-
eration of respects from their subjects with a quasi-independence, I
take as basic the specificative qua complexes. For a complex qua
phrase (‘S qua M’), taken reduplicatively, need not refer to a subject
different from that of the simple expression and so need not generate
new items in the domain. Here though I want to be able to model the
generation of respects as independent subjects from their base objects.
This model will also explain just in what ways reduplicative
propositions are true specificatively. For, although the Aristotelian
tradition makes this claim repeatedly, it does not explain in detail
how. For there is no explanation of how the reduplicative syntax and
semantics can reappear in the specificative ones, apart from the
vague intuition that reduplicative propositions describe respects of
the original subject, and so too do specificative propositions, and that
the specificative respects are more inclusive than the reduplicative.
But the differences in syntax and in semantics suggest that not ev-
erything true for reduplicative propositions and qua complexes will
hold for the specificative ones, and conversely.
5 The notion of possible worlds became prominent only later, due to the theo-
logical consideration of having to have a God free to choose in creating. Cf. Simo
Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy, London, 1993; Allan Bäck, ‘‘Avicenna
and Averroes: Modality and Theology,’’ in Potentialität und Possibilität, ed. T.
Buchheim et al., Stuttgart, 2001.
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The generation of respects in the formal model has the following
stages:
Form PREDICATES from propositions. Singular terms can be copu-
lated: ‘s’ becomes ‘being s’.6 Any individual term in a sentence can be
taken as the argument; with the rest of the sentence then is the
predicate. Pull these predicates out of the sentence so as to make
them available for combination. [IZZING]
Then apply the subordination function to each predicate so as to
get the predicates under which a predicate falls and those predicates
falling under it. This can be done formally or materially, with the
introduction of meaning postulates and stipulations of fact. [UO
(unterordnen)]
Intersect them. [The QUA operator]
Optional: add back in those predicates under which a predicate
falls and those predicates falling under it. [UO+ or UO–]
Take the resulting complex as a thing in its own right. [THINGING]
Generation of Respects
Let us start with a simple qua proposition of form ‘Φ qua Ψ is K’.
‘Φ qua Ψ’ is the qua complex. When taken specificatively, it signifies
‘‘a respect of that Φ’’, which is a different thing (which will become
a different item in the domain once thinged) than ‘Φ’. I now show
how to generate such respects from the qua proposition. Although ‘ 
qua Ψ’, taken specificatively, will have a fundamental symmetrical
structure of the intersection of izzed Φ and izzed Ψ, we shall still be
able to get to asymmetrical respects in ordinary discourse by distin-
guishing ‘Φ considered with
respect to Ψ’ and ‘Ψ considered with respect to Φ’.
So begin with izzing ‘Φ’ and ‘Ψ’. Izzed Φ and izzed Ψ will each be
correlated with a set of ‘‘predicates’’ as just defined above. Let these
sets be named ‘Φ’ and ‘Ψ’ [when there is no confusion in doing so].
Then perform the qua operation: ‘Φ qua Ψ’. I shall represent this as
‘ΦΨ’ [which will become useful when I use matrices and group theory
instead of set theory]. This gives the basic structure from which re-
spects of different sorts are generated.
6 Quine in Word and Object has predication serve a similar function: ‘is’ trans-
forms a singular term into something that can be attributed.
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So far we have generated the sets of predicates for Φ and for Ψ
with the izzing. The qua operator produces the intersection of those
sets so as to generate a set of predicates in each of which predicates
of Φ and Ψ appear. ‘ΦΨ’ itself, once thinged, is a respect.
This basic, symmetrical structure can be modified in various
ways in order to generate the various sorts of respects, or specifica-
tive qua complexes, that have been distinguished according to the
Aristotelian theories. Most of these sorts are asymmetrical, as with
the respect ‘‘the Ethiopian with respect to his teeth’’.7
To get these various sorts we need also to define ‘Σ considered
with respect to Μ’ and ‘Μ considered with respect to Σ’. These will be
respectively: ‘UO-(ΦΨ) qua Φ’ and likewise ‘UO-(ΦΨ) qua Ψ’. For
‘UO-(ΦΨ) with respect to Φ’, take ‘ΦΨ’, the intersection of Φ and Ψ,
i.e., Φ qua Ψ. For each predicate πi in ΦΨ, take UO-(πi). This amounts
to the possible instantiations for πi, namely all predicates falling
under πi with a higher degree of saturation than πi, until we get com-
pletely saturated predicates like ‘Φα’.
To get the actual instantiations for πi with respect to Φ, intersect
UO-(πi) with Φ—again a qua operation: [UO-(πi)] Φ. Then take the
union of all those sets. Let this be symbolized as: ΦΨ, as in effect we
have here all the predicates of Φ in which Ψ appears.
‘UO-(ΦΨ) with respect to Ψ’ can be defined likewise.
Using ΦΨ and ΨΦ we can define the various respects signified by
qua complexes and give a typology for the various types distin-
guished in the Aristotelian tradition. (I indicate parenthetically how
ΦΨ and ΨΦ could be taken as basic instead of Φ and Ψ.)
Reduplicative Propositions
If we return to the Aristotelian theory of reduplication, we can
see how this model accommodates it. To recap, the salient points for
the reduplicative propositions are: 1) the particular truth conditions
for the different types distinguished 2) the general claim that the
secundum quid ad simpliciter inference holds 3) the dictum that in
reduplicative syllogisms the qua phrase forms part of the predicate
and 4) the qua phrase does not make the subject term change its
reference 5) some account of why reduplicative propositions imply
their specificative counterparts.
7 I assume as an ontological fact that the world has fundamental asymmetry.
Thus in the interpretation I break the symmetry along Aristotelian lines.
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In the model, the features of the base thing Φ captured by the
qua complex, to form a predicate of the subject, comes from the izzed
but not thinged ‘Φ qua Ψ’, here expressed as the conjunction of all
predicates generated. As discussed, the predicates are generated by
taking all true wffs in which ‘Φ’ and ‘Ψ’ appear, replacing the term
for ‘Φ’ with a free variable, and making a conjunction of them (or
some of them, if there are further restrictions as with the restrictive
sort). Let this conjunction be represented by ‘Qx’. In effect ‘Qx’ is ‘x
is Φ qua Ψ’.
Given the truth of the reduplicative singular proposition, ‘f qua
Ψ is K’, we can say: Qf. Now certainly: Kf. Likewise for particular
and universal reduplicative propositions we can get ‘every/some Φ is
K’. So the secundum quid ad simpliciter inference holds—for logical
affirmations but not for all denials. In particular take a predicate P*
that the subject S falls under but not qua M. Then S qua M is not P*,
S is P*, but it is not the case that S is not P*. As above, it is better
to read the qua proposition thus: S is P not qua M’.
Now also: (x)(Φx ⊃ Qx); (x)(Qx ⊃ ΦΨx). That is, if we izz the re-
duplicative complex so as to make it a predicate function, we get for
every x if x is Φ, then x is ΦΨ’, i.e., x is Φ qua Ψ.
Thus far we have no respects but only predicates. To get the re-
spects these reduplicative predicates (‘ΦΨ’) must be thinged.
General reduplicative respects
The specificative respect generated from the general reduplica-
tive qua complex is: thinged (Φ  Ψ) (thinged ΦΨ  ΨΦ)—i.e., the in-
tersection of the sets of Φ and Ψ, once thinged. Here ‘Φ’ has all the
(first-order) predicates [‘πi’s’] of ΦΨ (‘Φ qua Ψ’), and so the secundum
quid ad simpliciter inference holds for the simple atomic wffs using
the first-order predicates of ΦΨ (containing no negations) and the in-
dividual constant signifying the respect.
For instance, the respect signified by ‘Socrates qua rational’
leaves out Socrates’ being snub-nosed. However, the secundum quid
ad simpliciter inference does not hold for ‘Socrates qua rational is not
snub-nosed; therefore Socrates is not snub-nosed’. (Actually it is bet-
ter to analyze the scope of the negation thus: Socrates is snub-nosed
not qua rational. In this case we do not consider the occurrence of
‘qua rational’ to generate a respect but to be merely reduplicative. If
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we do take it to generate a respect, still it is not the case that the
respect signified by ‘Socrates qua rational’ is snub-nosed.)
Restrictive reduplicative respects
The specificative respect generated from the restrictive redupli-
cative qua complex is: thinged (Φ  Ψ)  K (thinged [(ΦΨ  ΨΦ)  K]),
i.e.:
the intersection of the sets of ΦΨ and ΨΦ and K. once thinged.
Here ‘Φ’ has all the predicates [‘πi’s’] of ‘(Φ qua Ψ)  K’, and so the se-
cundum quid ad simpliciter inference holds for the simple atomic
wffs using the first-order predicates of ΦΨ (containing no negations)
and the individual constant signifying the respect. This one has a
double qua operation. So you might say that this is the purest feature
or respect as well as Aristotle’s favorite.
Abstractive reduplicative respects
The specificative respect generated from the abstractive redupli-
cative qua complex is: thinged ΦΨ (thinged [((ΦΨ  ΨΦ)  UO- ΦΨ)]),
which amounts to: the union of the intersection of the sets of ΦΨ and
ΨΦ, with the possible or actual instantiations of Φ added in, once
thinged. Here ‘Φ’ has all the predicates of ‘Φ qua Ψ’, and so the secun-
dum quid ad simpliciter inference holds for the simple atomic wffs
using the first-order predicates of ΦΨ (containing no negations) and
the individual constant signifying the respect.
Specificative Propositions
To recap, the salient points for the specificative propositions are:
1) some way to account for different part-whole relations 2) the gen-
eral claim that the secundum quid ad simpliciter inference does not
hold 3) the dictum that in specificative qua complexes the qua phrase
forms part of the subject and 4) the qua phrase makes the subject
term change its reference.
In the model, the features of the subject captured by the qua
complex to form a respect ‘‘that’’, a respect strictly speaking, indepen-
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dent of the subject, comes from the izzed and thinged ‘Φ qua Ψ’, here
expressed as the conjunction of all predicates generated. So, for all
qua com-plexes taken to signify respects, the qua phrase changes the
reference of the original subject: even the traditional ‘‘reduplicative’’
qua propositions taken specificatively. In addition, with the tradi-
tional specificative qua propositions, we izz ‘Φ qua Ψ’ ‘‘from the side
of the predicate’’, i.e., starting from ‘Ψ’.
Consider the set of properties of the Ethiopian and the set of
properties of the teeth.8 The idea is that here ‘qua teeth’ will restrict
the properties of the Ethiopian to his teeth part and its properties.
We do this by considering only those statements in which ‘the Ethio-
pian’ and ‘his teeth’ appear. By making the respect on the side of ‘his
teeth’ we can shift the reference so as to get something having prop-
erties different from those belonging to the Ethiopian ‘e’. For ‘e’ has
predicates like ‘(∃t)(Ee & Tt & Het & Wt)’, and the teeth ‘d’ has ones
like ‘(∃x)(Ex & Td & Hxd & Wd)’, which differ.
The restrictive respect will have only those predicates of the re-
duplicative respect that are coextensive with the predicate of the
original qua proposition—in this example, ‘white’. The respect then
is limited to the teeth predicates having to do with its color at or
above the level of generality of ‘white’: e.g., ‘being white’, ‘being col-
ored’, ‘appearing on a surface’ etc.
The abstractive respect has the predicates common to the Ethio-
pian e and his teeth t, like ‘Ex & Ty & Hxy & Wy’, as well as those
particular predicates and instantiations of it belonging to the Ethio-
pian e, like ‘(∃t)(Ee & Tt & Het & Wt)’.
The specificative respect thinging all the teeth predicates/prop-
erties of the Ethiopian will have the common predicates, like ‘Ex &
Ty & Hxy & Wy’, as well as predicates proper to these teeth and dif-
ferent from those of its subject, the Ethiopian, like ‘(∃x)(Ex & Td &
Hxd & Wd)’.
Conclusions
In sum, on this analysis: 1) the secundum quid ad simpliciter in-
ference does not hold for the specificative respect even for all the
8 Ordinary language may have to be regimented or translated into a part-whole
language to make all the details clear. But taking ‘predicate’ in my sense enables us
to bypass this issue, for the statements explaining part-whole relations are in the
domain and we can then makes those statements into ‘predicates’ by izzing them.
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positive attributes. If we require some overlap of predicates between
a thing and its respect, a specificative respect will have some predi-
cates of the thing. Still it will always have some predicates that its
base does not have [at least predicates that are not respectable (‘be-
ing thought up or stated by me’) or are of higher order (‘being its
respect’)]. Different part-whole relations can be accommodated by the
predicates’ being generated from dif-ferent sets of propositions about
‘Φ’ and ‘Ψ’. 2) The qua phrase now modifies the subject term. 3) It
changes the reference of the subject term.
4) We can make partial sense of the claim that reduplicative
propositions hold specificatively. First, there is the notion that what
is izzed and not thinged is a constituent of the same thing izzed and
thinged. Second, as we have seen, there is a way to generate specifi-
cative respects using the reduplicative analyses. Beyond this, as the
syntax and semantics for the reduplicative and the specificative
types differ so much, we should not expect too much agreement: in
particular that a qua proposition taken reduplicatively is true spec-
ificatively. For think of the secundum quid ad simpliciter inference.
These results agree with the main claims made about the rela-
tionship between specificative and reduplicative propositions by the
Aristotelian tradition: that the secundum quid ad simpliciter infer-
ence fails for the specificative but holds for the reduplicative, and
that there is a (vague!) sense in which what is true reduplicatively
is true specificatively. That sense has to be vague. For, strictly speak-
ing, a reduplicative proposition still does not have the logical form of
a specificative proposition. For propositions of the two types differ in
their semantics especially. To give the reduplicative a common
ground with the specificity, we must suppose the same semantics
and take the reduplicative propositions to generate respects too.
Even then, strictly speaking, the secundum quid ad simpliciter infer-
ence fails, in the case of reduplicative propositions taken so as to
generate respects, for predicates that are not logically affirmative.
Thus I have presented a general model for qua propositions. It
remains to show how useful it can be.
